

CAIRO'S TIME BOMB: WHO IS COMING TO THE RESCUE?

What's a development project?: you've a problem, the patient is dying, and you put an oxygen tank...to succeed, you need five elements: someone asking for help with a vision or frustration, so political will; a donor with money; the implementation agency; the experts and the methodology...this is artificial, if you take it, the patient dies. So each element needs to be replaced by something that is sustainable: legislation to support the weak or unconfident leader; autonomous ways of funding; local institutions; local working processes and trained counterparts. This is a good program design, but it is not quick. UN Habitat Official

From the top floor of the Nile City Towers in Cairo's Corniche, overlooking the Nile River, Luca Citarella and Stephane David were shielded from the searing heat of Egypt's summer. The top officials for the European Union (EU) Delegation to Egypt were preparing the opening remarks for the annual 2018 workshop that aimed to take stock of the EU-financed projects in Cairo. With around 20 million inhabitants, a fifth of Egypt's population, Cairo was Africa's largest city by population, the capital of the largest Arab country in the world, and the fastest-growing city worldwide in terms of population, growing by 0.5 million/year and projected to reach 40 million by 2050¹. All this made Cairo central to the EU activities to put the 'Southern Neighbourhood countries' into a sustainable development path.² The EU activities aimed to implement the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004 and revised in 2015, to help support and foster stability, security and prosperity in the countries closest to the EU borders. The ENP confirmed a "strongly held view the EU should uphold and promote universal values of good governance, democracy, rule of law, and human rights".³ Further, the policy aimed to create conditions to help the neighbouring countries access loans and grants to finance the development of social and economic infrastructure to reduce poverty and inequality and stimulate economic growth and job creation. Other workshop participants were the European Investment Bank (EIB), the three Greater Cairo Governorates, the Egyptian Housing Ministry, public bodies such as the Informal Settlement Development Fund (ISDF), the Social Fund for Development (SFD) and Tahya Misr (Long Live Egypt) Fund, UN Habitat, and European development agencies such as the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and German Development Agency (GIZ).

¹ Euromonitor International 2017. Global Economics and Consumers

² Other countries included Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Palestine (the inclusion of the latter was not to be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine by the EU member states)

³ Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 2015. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security policy, European Commission Brussels, 18th November

Professor Nuno Gil prepared this case as the basis for class discussion and research. The case does not intend to serve as endorsement, source of primary data, or illustration of effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. The author is solely responsible for any factual inaccuracy. I thank the support of the AMBS Strategic Research Fund, the Project Management Institute, as well as of the organizations that agreed to participate in this study and of all the participating students

On top of the agenda were the projects approved by the European Commission in 2012 to help the Egyptian authorities upgrade the informal areas of Greater Cairo — a megacity with one of the highest population densities in the world⁴ and where two thirds of the inhabitants lived in informal settlements and slums with limited access to water, electricity, and sewerage and lacked land tenure, basic social services, street lighting and paved streets.⁵ Despite the years of political upheaval following the Arab Spring in 2011, the projects that were directly sponsored by the EU delegation in Cairo seemed to be doing well. For example, since 2012, the EU had awarded over €40m in grants to the GIZ Participatory Development Program (PDP), which had stayed largely on schedule. The GIZ PDP aimed to impact 2 bn people living across nine informal areas. And a GIZ PDP subproject, co-financed with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, even went on to receive an international urban innovation award.

In contrast, the innovative €178 million (Neighbourhood Investment Facility) NIF South-25 project, agreed by the EU headquarters with the Egyptian Ministry of International Cooperation in 2012, had been beset by delays and the 5-year project was running several years late. The NIF-South-25 project was a 'blended facility' by which the EU committed grants to leverage loans to be provided by the EIB and AFD — *“The idea is to put a small amount of money and you create multiplier effects. This is a good approach because the loans most of the times are focusing on the hard work, while with the grants, you can focus on technical assistance and capacity building and other kind of things. But you've to have a very strong supportive team to solve all the institutional obstacles that are typical of this kind of projects when you mix many stakeholders”*, said an EU official. Specifically, in 2012, the EU had committed a €33.5m grant to leverage €45m in loans from the EIB to a Community Development Programme (CDP); and committed a €15m grant to leverage a €80m AFD loan to an Unplanned Areas and Slums Upgrading Programme (UASUP). To build local capabilities, both EIB and AFD were delegating the implementation of their project to SFD, an Egyptian public agency, which in turn delegated the implementation of the infrastructure development projects to the Governorates and the implementation of the micro-credit lines to local banks. In the AFD project, the implementation of the loan element to finance micro-credits was on schedule. But the implementation of the grant element towards infrastructure development in 6 informal areas (eg roads, water networks, sewage, upgrading of open spaces, market areas, street lighting) was running around 3 years late. More frustratingly, there were no signs yet as to when the implementation of the EIB project was about to start.

These delays, vis-à-vis the rapid growth of Cairo's population and urban informality fuelled a consensus on a need to find innovative ways to accelerate development aid — *“If you decide to extend a water, power, or sanitation scheme for 200km, it seems a lot, but it's not a lot... before it's finish, it's too short”*, said a EU official. This challenge motivated initiatives such as the Union for the Mediterranean — an intergovernmental organization established in

⁴ Over 100,000/ sqkm Simms, D 2004. The Case of Cairo: Informal Settlements on Former Agricultural Land

⁵ Slum was the technical term for the most deprived form of informal settlements. Most informal areas in Cairo were not, however, slums in the sense of shantytowns, but rather unplanned areas where the quality of the construction was reasonably good, with buildings sometimes up to five stories high

1995, which brought together the EU and the 15 neighbouring countries to “*address the three strategic objectives of the region: stability, human development and integration.*”⁶ Pressed by an evolving development policy context including the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the European Commission (which was roughly investing €1 bn/year in Africa) was asking its members to put up more money to assist the neighbouring countries. The EIB too was looking to do more through its Economic Resilience Initiative so as to accelerate urban development and render projects bankable to the standards of EIB.⁷ An official said – “*When you have targets like SDG 11, you cannot do business as usual - the old traditional themes disappear. I'm now talking about cities, urban development, slum upgrading.*”

Complicating development assistance to Egypt was a resurgence of authoritarianism, enhancing the power of the state institutions to act without public oversight since 2014. And in 2015, the EU warned the Egyptian government that some provisions of a new local law restricting the activities of NGOs in Egypt were “*likely to directly affect European cooperation assistance*”⁸. Yet, indifferent to the EU concerns, the Egyptian state went ahead with the new law. Further, it announced an alliance by which China state-owned contractors would be awarded multi-billion dollar contracts to build New Cairo, a controversial \$45bn new capital, 40km away from central Cairo.⁹ And ironically, at the same time the Egyptian state was agreeing cooperation priorities with the EU, including a “*share commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and the respect of human rights*”,¹⁰ it was receiving billions of dollars in financial assistance from Saudi Arabia, one of the world's most authoritarian regimes. As well as this, the Egyptian government had started to bulldoze the Maspero Triangle, an unplanned, historical district in central Cairo where thousands of families lived– “*how can a proud country kill its heritage?*”, asked the UK-based liberal Guardian newspaper¹¹. Amid a growing tension between the values espoused by donors and multilaterals and those by the Egyptian state, one thing seemed sure. The world was running out of time to help Egypt upgrade the slums of Cairo. What could Luca and Stephane do?

Egypt

Egypt, as one of the cradles of civilisation, was in dire straits as the country marched into the XXI century. With more than 95% of its population concentrated on the Nile River valley and delta (which represented only 6.5% of the country's area), Egypt was struggling to cope

⁶ <https://ufmsecretariat.org/who-we-are/>

⁷ Through the Economic Resilience Initiative, EIB committed to increase its financing by an additional €6bn over a 5-year period starting from October 2016 for the Southern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans. The EIB estimated the €6bn would deliver €15bn of extra investment in the eligible countries by 2020.

⁸ EU Statement of the new NGO law in Egypt. 31 May 2015. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/27183/Statement%20on%20the%20new%20NGO%20law%20in%20Egypt

⁹ By 2018, the value of construction projects implemented by Chinese companies had reached \$7.6bn. Omran H. 2018. Chinese companies implement \$7.59bn worth of construction projects in Egypt. Daily News, Nov28

¹⁰ EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities 2017-2020. Association between the European Union and Egypt. The Association Council. Brussels, 16 June

¹¹ Farid, F 2018. How can a proud country kill its heritage? Cairo calls time on oldest watch shop. The Guardian, 7 August

with a steady increase of its population – which was adding more than one million people per year to a country where only 6% of the land was arable.¹² These concerns had motivated a new law limiting cash assistance to poor families to two children, and a family-planning campaign “Two is Enough” aiming to challenge traditions of large families in poor communities. But complicating matters, the instability in the Middle East was also putting pressure on Egypt’s population, and by 2018, the number of refugees was about to reach over 5 million people¹³. With half of the country’s population below the age of 25¹⁴, Egypt had thus become the most populous country of North Africa and the Arab World, and the third-most populous in Africa.

Politically and economically, the country had also seen major changes since the turn of the century. After the downfall of the dictatorship regime of Hosni Mubarak during the Arab Spring, a new president was elected in 2012, Mohammed Morsi, and for some time the world thought the country was about to embrace the values of liberal democracies. But supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, Morsi began instead to set up a dictatorship underpinned on a strict Islamist policy, putting the individual liberties on hold. After a new wave of mobilisation took place across the country, Morsi was forced out of power by the Egyptian Armed Forces, and the head of the Armed Forces, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, became president in 2014. Al-Sisi’s government outrightly classified the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, and a period of political instability and terrorism ensued that weakened the economy and led to a drop of 60% of tourists stay by 2015¹⁵. By 2016, struggling to bring down the unemployment rates and the current account deficit, Egypt was forced to accept a USD \$12 billion loan from International Monetary Fund (IMF). The loan was made conditional on the country undertaking essential reforms such as the full flotation of the Egyptian pound, which led to an initial depreciation of the currency by 50%. These measures enabled to consolidate the fiscal targets, but also led to a rapid increase in inflation, which reached 25% at the end of 2016.

With the arrival of Al-Sisi to power in 2014, the country saw a resurgence of its long authoritarian tradition, not by declaring a state of emergency, but by operating through legal channels that granted the executive, courts, security services, and the chief prosecutor immense discretion in interpreting the letter of the law. Standing between the central executive and cash-strapped municipalities with hardly any in-house technical capabilities were 26 Governorates that were headed by Governors. These high governmental officials, whose role was modelled after the French “Préfet”, represented the central government, and were responsible to ensure the local branches of state services functioned properly. But the Governors, who were appointed directly by the President, lacked any policymaking power – they were just “the eyes of the president”. Civil society groups were also quite constrained in what they could do by laws that restricted freedom of assembly, bans on politically affiliated

¹² <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/egypt-population/>

¹³ UNHCR. Aside from Syria, refugees come from, among other countries, Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Eritrea.

¹⁴ Un Habitat Public Spaces and the tight to the city. Greater Cairo Region Egypt. UN Human Settlements Programme, Giza, Egypt

¹⁵ Source: Central bank of Egypt. In the years preceding the events of 2011, there was an average 15 million tourists annually, in 2015 there were only 8.9 million. Error! Reference source not found.

groups on university campus, and the severity of associated punishments. Further, in May 2017, Al-Sisi signed a law restricting the scope and activities of all NGOs by establishing a public body (the National Authority for the Regulation of Non-Governmental Foreign Organizations) with a mandate to monitor all NGOs receiving foreign funding from choices for their leadership to the meeting schedule – a law that, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of assembly and association Maina Kiai said, threatened to “devastate the country’s civil society for generations to come and turn it into a government puppet.”

Challenges notwithstanding, as a country of origin for migrants entering Europe, and the most populous country of the Arab World, Egypt remained central to the EU efforts to bring stability and prosperity to the Mediterranean basin and contain the migration crisis (**Exhibit 1**). Guiding the terms of the cooperation was the Association Agreement signed in 2001 that informed the 2017-2020 EU-Egypt partnership priorities agreed in 2017 in light of the European Neighbourhood Policy (**Exhibit 2**). The aim of the partnership priorities was to “promote joint interests and guarantee long-term stability on both sides of the Mediterranean”.¹⁶ As part of a call for mutual cooperation, the EU committed to support the Egyptian government's efforts to strengthen its migration governance framework; to empower local authorities in planning and delivering public services; to ensure equality in economic, social and political opportunities; and to support efforts to protect marginalised groups and improve the delivery of education and health systems. And at odds with the legislative developments in Egypt, the EU-Egypt partnership priorities were guided by a “*shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms, and the respect of human rights as constitutional rights of all citizens*”.

Greater Cairo Informal Settlements

Greater Cairo was the largest metropolitan area on the African continent, where over 20 million people lived. By 2018, the rapid boom in population since the sixties (when it was around 6 million people), together with decades of inefficient housing policies, had left Cairo with a wide gap between housing supply and demand. As a result, the informal housing market had become the only market affordable to urban dwellers with low or middle incomes. This was to the extent that around 60% of Cairo’s population lived in unplanned settlements (with over 28,000 families living in settlements classified as unsafe and thus in need or urgent relocation). Crucially, the population growth rate in informal areas was around 3.4% per year, compared to 0.3% for the planned areas¹⁷ (**Exhibit 3a,b**). Informal areas were characterised by a lack of basic public amenities such as water, electricity, and sanitation, as well as social infrastructure such as schools, health centres, libraries and youth centres (**Exhibit 4**). Further, the lack of land titling left people living under the threat of forced evictions and the lack of street lightening and paved streets made the areas unsafe. All this left the young population suffering from a high incidence of poverty, health problems and unemployment, and vulnerable to radicalization and calls to join terrorist organizations.

¹⁶ General Secretariat of the Council (2017). EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities 2017-2020. Association between the European Union and Egypt. The Association Council. Brussels, 16 June

¹⁷ Denis E, Sejourne M. 2002. Information System for Informal Settlements: Ministry of Planning & GTZ.

Whilst the Egyptian government had long been aware of the steady growth of the informal settlements of Cairo, for four decades the government had adopted an expansionist approach by which the Housing Ministry sought to persuade the poor to move to new social housing constructed in desert land such as 6th of October. But this approach had systematically failed to attract the poor who not only lacked money to pay the rents, but also did not want to move to the desert, away from the job opportunities and social networks in central Cairo, and facing long commutes with hardly any public transport available. This was to the extent that in many cases after the poor had been transferred to new cities, they would end up returning to their original neighbourhoods in central Cairo even though their homes had been demolished. As a result, the expansionist approach had produced numerous “ghost cities”, with over a million housing units vacant, whilst the informal areas in Cairo continued to grow steadily (**Exhibit 5**). And yet, the expansionist approach remained deep seated in government. By 2015/16, investment in new cities such as New Cairo was taking a third of the Built Environment budget, though benefiting only 2% of the population. In contrast, a similar amount was being spent on existing cities and villages, where 98% of the Egyptians lived (**Exhibits 6, 7a,b**)

Expansionist approach notwithstanding, after a 2008 rockslide at the informal Al-Doweika district in Cairo killed over 130 people, the Egyptian government set up the Informal Settlement Development Fund (ISDF) to compile the informal areas and develop a plan to develop those areas or move people out.¹⁸ Following criteria set by the UN Human Settlements Program (UN-Habitat), ISDF distinguished between safe and unsafe areas, and by 2012, the public agency had mapped out 53 areas in Cairo as unsafe due to imminent threats such as flood pathway, health risks, or unsuitable sheltering conditions; further, ISDF identified over 1 million people living in unsafe areas. After the Arab Spring, the problem of informal settlements got high in the government agenda, and in 2014, ISDF was elevated into a Ministry. A former government official recalled:

A country emerging from the grassroots of revolution... that was looking to champion the cause of marginalized people... the prime-minister knew about slums, about the importance of improving people's lives...he wanted us to focus on slums, and if it was not but for him, informal settlements would not have taken a priority in Egypt

By 2015, ISDF had lost its Ministerial status. But the elimination of unsafe areas remained a government priority (**Exhibit 7**). Central to the new rehousing policy was Al Asmarat, a EGP 5billion (~\$320m) social housing district that aimed to offer over 20,000 residential units to accommodate around 100,000 people, including all the inhabitants to be evicted from the unsafe areas in the Al-Doweika district. Unlike the former new cities, Al Asmarat was about an hour away by public transportation, was thus relatively close to Central Cairo. By 2016, nearly 10,000 families had been relocated to furnished residential units, 63sqm in line with Egypt's family-planning policies, for 300 Egyptian pounds (~ \$17) per month. But even Al Asmarat was not without critics, who pointed to a lack of social infrastructure (schools, markets, community centres) and rules prohibiting the residents from starting local

¹⁸ ISDF 2009 Terms of reference for data collection of slum areas (unsafe and unplanned) in the governorates of the republic.

businesses. But by 2015, the mind-set was changing, and officials were becoming aware of the need to supplement housing with social infrastructure. A former ISDF official recalled:

The first phase was shocking. It (Al-Asmarat) was all residential buildings, row upon row, not a single park, a community area, pre- schools, pharmacies, stores, cafes, nothing. When I asked the Governor why there had been no provision for that, he said “no, that will take away precious land I need for housing units.” But in the 2nd phase, we added them... but the transport issue is humongous, only one bus every two hours and costs an awful lot of money

Proud of what government had achieved, in an official opening of the first two phases of Al Asmarat in 2016, President Al-Sisi mandated ISDF to eliminate all unsafe areas by 2018, and warned that, “I will not allow anyone [to imply certain things about the government] by producing movies that document the circumstances of poor citizens, especially as we are here today to launch these new residential areas to give Egyptians a new standard of living.”¹⁹

The Development Ecosystem in Egypt

The presence of the international development sector in Egypt had been a constant for many decades to assist the state in economic and social development. Some actors were elements of large multinational organizations such as UN-Habitat, a specialised agency of the United Nations to promote sustainable urban development. Other international actors were large charitable organizations such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation or the Ford Foundation. Others were state-owned implementation agencies such as the German Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). And others were development banks such as the French Agence Francaise de Developpement (AFD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), KfW, a German state-owned development bank, and the World Bank (WB). A central concern by the key players in the development sector was to create conditions by which the development banks felt confident to lend money to the Egyptian state. For example, the EU policymakers expected that by making money available in the form of grants, they could encourage the EIB and AFD to make loans available for bankable projects, through the so-called blended facility instruments. By 2015, the financial leverage effect of the EU was 1:6.9, meaning that for every euro provided by the EU in the form of a grant, €6.9 of lending or investment had been mobilised from the European financial institutions²⁰.

French Development Agency (AFD)

The Agence Francaise de Developpement (AFD), created in 1941, was the arm of the French government to implement its foreign policy as set out in France's Framework Document for Development Cooperation. AFD aimed to finance and support projects to improve living conditions through a network of dozens of agencies around the world. In practical terms, AFD's mission had evolved towards that of a development bank, having been granted this status by the European Central Bank on 30 June 2017. Hence, AFD mainly carried its mission by providing loans, grants, expertise and technical assistance. As well as

¹⁹<https://dailynewsegypt.com/2016/05/30/all-perpetrators-of-minya-sectarian-strife-will-be-held-accountable-al-sisi/>

²⁰ [https://bankwatch.org/ENPguide/index.php?title=Neighbourhood_Investment_Facility_\(NIF\)](https://bankwatch.org/ENPguide/index.php?title=Neighbourhood_Investment_Facility_(NIF))

this, AFD was one of the European development agencies that were accredited by the EU to manage European delegated funds. The terms of the loans allocated by AFD were determined by the nature of the project, the context (political, economic, social and environmental) and the quality of the borrower (rating, guarantees). For the development of the poorest countries, the AFD also used, occasionally, grants to finance actions in the social sector (health, education), rural and urban development initiatives and infrastructure projects. But grants represented a small proportion of the funds committed by the AFD, and by 2018, 83% of the 11.4 billion euros committed by the AFD were in the form of loans (**Exhibit 8**).

As a lender, AFD did not act as an implementing agency. In Egypt, AFD only had a small team overseeing the projects, operating from the French embassy by they lacked technical or project management expertise. Projects were instead implemented by local public agencies such as the Social Development Fund (SFD), with AFD technical staff based in Paris offering technical assistance, monitoring progress and quality, and giving no-objection notices to requests for funds, tenders, and contract awards. But it was up to the local office to monitor progress on day by day basis, build a relationship of trust with SFD, and organise supervision missions from head office twice a year to take stock of progress; a Paris-based official said

This role-play between the local agency and head office is important, the agency will cultivate a relationship of trust with the counterpart, even if it means passing off the head office for the bad cop, the person who says no, who says, it'll not meet our criteria, etc...It happens we find ourselves playing this role (control/monitoring), but our goal is to create a space of trust to understand each other and create the conditions necessary for the project to achieve its objectives. For this, it is better to have a relationship of trust, rather than control.

GIZ

The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) was a German development agency providing services in the field of international development cooperation. Unlike AFD, GIZ was more than a bank and thus not only provided finance and technical support, but also implemented projects in areas such as economic and urban development and employment promotion, energy and the environment, and peace and security. Like AFD, GIZ was also a main bilateral partner of the EU. Further, and also like AFD, GIZ financial agreements included subsidy agreements, grant agreements and financing agreements. Due to its regional significance, Egypt was an important partner for Germany, and thus GIZ has been implementing projects in Egypt since the mid-50s, using a mix of in-house staff and local and international consultants. In particular, in Egypt, GIZ run the oldest Participatory Development Program (PDP) worldwide since 2004 – a program that was focused on working with Community Development Associations (CDAs) and local NGOs to give a voice to the poor and use consensus-oriented processes to develop lists of local priorities before starting to implement physical and social infrastructure projects. The first PDP, between 2004 and 2010, had benefited from a €26.8m EU grant, and was at the time the only international development cooperation program to target the living conditions in the informal areas.

The GIZ PDP espoused the idea of a power reversal between the implementation agencies and the poor, the ultimate beneficiaries. And so, in efforts to “put the last first”, GIZ adopted

the principle of participatory development endorsed by the United Nations, OECD, and other multilateral organizations. A participatory approach aimed to go beyond consultation. Instead, it was about defining priorities through consensus-seeking procedures, embracing the ideas of empowerment and shared control, where the development professionals would become facilitators of a locally-driven process. The aim was to harness the local know-how of needs and constraints that communities possessed as well as their networks to design projects that effectively addressed their needs: *“the empowerment of the people to effectively involve themselves in creating the structures and in designing policies and programmes that serve the interests of all as well as to effectively contribute to the development process and share equitably in its benefits”*²¹

The participatory approach draw directly on the UN Declaration of the Right to Development adopted in 1986, which said *“The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy.”* By 2005, the same principle had been crystallised in the World Charter for the Right to the City, *“all persons have the right to participate through direct and representative forms in the elaboration, definition, implementation, and fiscal distribution and management of public spaces and municipal budgets (Clause 1.2, article 2).* The participatory development was deemed more efficient than bureaucratic management, but not without its critics considering the time it took to build a consensus. Further, there was no guarantee the local stakeholders would cooperate, that mutual trust could emerge, that consensus could be achieve, or that the approach failed to capture the voices of the poor due to power differentials – and thus the warnings against the “tyranny of participatory development”.²² One local NGO experienced in implementing a participatory approach said:

one the major obstacles is a lack of trust between the community and researchers.. if it's done correctly, participatory design is within a legal framework that binds the decision-makers to the results... but in Egypt, it's purely voluntary, so it's a fluid process...the other problem is this utopian distinction between consultation and participation because it sort of puts things in a hierarchy of what's good and bad practice. Whereas a lot of it relates to what you can get done, practically speaking... when you're calling for a meeting, you've decided on the things to be discussed, so you've already created a hierarchy...and if through this long process of participatory design , we come up with a certain solution but we know it will never come to light, then an element of pragmatism has to come in where you make certain executive decisions ...there's always a play of power involved, many issues, political, social, economic and also pragmatic come into account...that's why I don't like claiming we do participatory design because I don't think we do. We do design by consultation

European Investment Bank (EIB)

Another key player in the donor sector in Egypt, the European Investment Bank (EIB) was the only bank owned by and representing the interests of the EU Member States. As a EU

²¹ African Charter on Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, UN 1986-90 Programme for African Economic Recovery and Development

²² Cleaver, F 2001, 'Institutions, Agency and the Limitations of Participatory Approaches to Development', in Cooke, B, and U Kothari (eds), Participation: The New Tyranny?, London & New York, Zed Books

body, the EIB was governed by both public and corporate governance principles towards helping to improve the economy, create jobs, promote equality and improve lives for EU citizens and for people in developing countries. As a financial institution, EIB offered loans, guarantees, equity investments and advisory services to the public and private sectors. Further, EIB could blend loans with grants in order to mobilize finance for critical projects, with grants typically coming from public bodies and philanthropic organisations. The idea of blending facilities was to reduce the overall riskiness of projects and mobilise extra capital. Like the AFD, the EIB was used to 'delegate' project implementation to local public agencies in that sense the bank saw project implementation as the responsibility of the counterparts/promoters who "owned" the development projects. Further, to supervise project implementation, the lender used the support of consultants. As an official said

We, EIB, are a financier; we are primarily here to support, but when it comes to implementation in such challenging countries, we need to be properly supported to monitor the full range of implementation issues... Day-to-day monitoring can only be done efficiently with a good technical assistance. We are a lending arm of the EU, part of the big EU family. So basically we are a bank, an instrument to project finance

The relationship of EIB with Egypt had more than 4 decades, with Cairo Metro having received almost €1 billion in financing from EIB. But EIB had only opened a small representation in Egypt in 2003, the first EIB office outside the EU, which was initially tasked to serve the whole Mashreq region. As such, the Egyptian projects were monitored from the EIB headquarters in Luxemburg. In Egypt, the EIB operations had to follow the European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU External Lending Mandates. More generally, the EIB was responsible for managing the European Development Fund (EDF), the EU's main instrument for providing development aid, created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome and launched in 1959. The EDF was aligned with the mission of EIB in that it aimed to fund cooperation activities in the fields of economic, social and human development as well as regional cooperation and integration. For the period 2014-2020, the financial resources made available by the 11th EDF amounted to €30.5 bn. This budget was financed by contributions from the Member States, although it was kept outside the EU budget and thus agreed in parallel with the negotiations of the other external instruments financed under the EU budget.

Social Fund for Development (SFD)

The Social Fund for Development (SFD) had been established in 1991 with support from the World Bank as a semi-governmental Egyptian public agency body to help the State develop Egypt in core directions including: establishing job opportunities, improve provision of public services, and enhance living conditions in informal urban areas and rural areas. Unlike the Governorates and other public agencies owned by the State, SFD was not part of the government structure, even if it had to abide by the government policy. Instead, SFD was governed by a diverse board of directors, which included government ministers, public figures, NGOs and academia, having the Prime Minister as the head of the board. The SFD had no direct funding lines from the Egyptian government, but rather depended on funds from international organizations such as the World Bank, UN, EU, and national agencies from donor countries, which delegated on SFD the responsibility to implement the development

aid projects. SFD in turn would seek to implement the projects in partnership with Community Development Associations, NGOs, the Governorates, and other public agencies such as the National Water agency. SFD's portfolio was rich in labour-intensive projects to develop basic infrastructure, protect natural resources, and improve the living conditions in rural and urban informal areas. Other projects in the SFD portfolio related with making credit lines quickly available to SMEs. But not everyone was supportive of SFD's role as an implementation agency in that SFD was not fully integrated with the Egyptian government. Further, some observers were critical of SFD priorities around labour-intensive projects– “a bit like peeing in the pants, only feels good initially,” remarked one UN Habitat official.

Tahya Misr (Long Live Egypt) Fund

The Tahya Misr (Long Live Egypt) Fund was established by a presidency decree in July 2014, right after President Al-Sisi was elected, to bolster the Egyptian economy. The Tahya became a legal entity through Law No. 139/2014, which was amended by Law No. 84/2015. Making “Natasharak” (cooperation) its slogan, the fund headed by the Prime Minister put emphasis on social and economic development, stating in its Article VII that: “*the Tahya Misr Fund shall be competent to supporting the State to establish service and development projects, develop slums, tackle the problem of street children and homeless, help set up micro, small and medium enterprises, develop infrastructure projects, and other projects that contribute to support the country's social and economic position.* In cooperation with ISDF and the Housing Ministry, the Fund was focused on eliminating unsafe slums in two years, to deliver the 2016 public pledge by President Al-Sisi. To this purpose, the Fund was supporting efforts to build new housing units on vacant military-owned desert land such as the Tahya Misr or El-Asmarat City, making the land that would become vacant in the city centre available for real estate developments. The Fund had publicly committed to adopt policies to improve the standard of living of Egyptian citizens in a manner that guaranteed their rights and their living conditions. The sources of the money were funds transferred from the Ministries, Army, and donations from the civil society including businessmen, politicians, and private firms. But despite political pressure to donate, with donations in the order of EGP 8 bn by 2016 (\$500m), the fund was struggling to achieve its EGP 100bn target²³.

UN Habitat

UN Habitat was the UN programme for human settlements and sustainable urban development. Established in 1978 in the aftermath of the UN's first conference on human settlements and urban development, UN Habitat was headquartered in Kenya and worked under a mandate to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities. UN Habitat was very much committed to help implement global policies such as the New Urban Agenda adopted at the UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) in 2016 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with a specific focus on SDG 11- *to make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable*. As a custodian agency, UN Habitat aimed to play a coordination role of monitoring and assessing the SDG11 implementation, espousing the principles of integrated and participatory approaches to

²³ Extra News TV, 22 March, 2017. www.yoututbe.com/watch?v=AsrysbVEeg

development, the preservation of cultural heritage; and the integration of slums and informal settlements into the social, economic, cultural, and political dimensions of cities.²⁴

With a quarter of the world population living in slums in 2018, tackling the steady rise of slum dwellers was a priority to UN Habitat. In Egypt, working with government and public bodies, UN Habitat had been giving technical advice both at project and policy levels for more than 10 years. And since 2011, UN Habitat had even established a Regional Office for the Arab States (ROAS) in Cairo, which in 2016 saw its Arab Strategy for Housing and Sustainable Urban Development 2030 endorsed by the League of Arab States. The Strategy offered a framework for joint Arab action in housing and sustainable urban development, and was aligned with the City Prosperity Index, a 2012 UN Habitat tool that defined a prosperous city as one that provided productivity, infrastructure development, quality of life, equity and social inclusion, and environmental sustainability. Specifically in Egypt, UN Habitat had been supporting government around strategic planning and governance through staff co-located in the General Organization for Physical Planning, and fully paid by central government. The relationships of UN Habitat with government were thus so strong to the extent one Minister of Housing had been a former Head of UN Habitat – “UN Habitat is very much sleeping with national government”, summarised a senior UN Habitat staff member.

The European Neighbourhood Policy

The EU's relations with the closest of the Eastern and Southern Neighbours including Egypt were governed by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). With a budget of 15.4 billion euros for 2014-2020, the EU Commission had signed an agreement with each country under the umbrella of ENP. For Egypt, the priorities targeted poverty alleviation, local development and social protection; governance, transparency and business environment, and the environment in order to pursue social justice, job creation, economic prosperity and improved living conditions²⁵. Underpinning these priorities were the notions of rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. These priorities were aligned with the prevailing ideas on what works and does not work with aid, as agreed in high-level forums on aid effectiveness, and consolidated in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (**Exhibit 9a, 9b**). Since the European Commission lacked project implementation capabilities, the implementation of the ENP rested with the development agencies of the member states. The latter had to submit proposals to the EU Commission Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), which managed the development programs such as the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) and other bilateral cooperation funds financed by the EU budget under the ENP. For aid to Egypt, the DG NEAR had about €120m/year– a sum of money decided by the EU Parliament and

²⁴ With a focus on technical support, UN Habitat was thus different from the UN development agency (UNDP), promoting technical and investment cooperation to help countries achieve the SDGs.

²⁵ General Secretariat of the Council (2017). EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities 2017-2020. Association between the European Union and Egypt. The Association Council. Brussels, 16 June: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/pdf/EU-Egypt_pdf/

Council per request of the European Commission²⁶ (**Exhibit 10**). A EU project was expected to take 3 years to formulate, 5 years to implement, and 2 years to close; one official said:

We're a big elephant, not quick at all, but once we move we can make an impact...so when we get a proposal from the Egyptian authorities, it can take up to 5 years before we move into implementation... one of the most favoured modes to implement projects is delegated cooperation, recognizing national agencies have more savoir faire and experience...the agencies send us a proposal and we've a decision-making process at headquarters until we manage to sign a financial agreement... we never move without having first a framework with the Egyptian government. We may be able to sign two, three agreements in one year.

The European Commission trusted on their partners to implement the projects, and monitored them through the local delegations and missions from Brussels. Further, the EU had to approve any changes proposed by the partners to the terms of the agreement with the recipients of aid – “delegated corporation does not mean you wash your hands and don't follow-up”, said an EU official. In Cairo, two urban development projects managed by DG NEAR were the GIZ PDP and the Integrated and Sustainable Housing and Community Development Program, NIF-South 25. Together, they sought to impact the lives of billions of inhabitants of Cairo that lived in safe but unplanned areas (**Exhibit 11**).

GIZ Participatory Development Programme (PDP)

Embracing the spirit of the Arab Spring, in 2012, at the request of the Egyptian Ministry of International Cooperation, the GIZ PDP was awarded €20m of EU funding to focus on four informal areas of Greater Cairo (**Exhibit 12**). And by late 2013, the PDP had been expanded to reach out another 5 informal areas, reaching over 2 million poor, and attracting further funding from the EU as well as from the German government through the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, which was spearheading a global initiative, the Marshall Plan with Africa (**Exhibit 13**). GIZ projects were focused on basic works to be carried on by the civic society including NGOs and Community Development Associations (CDAs). To identify local needs and define priorities through consensus-oriented processes, GIZ employed local NGOs to undertake Focus Groups Discussions and Key Informant Interviews, a process that could last several months. By late 2014, however, the politically regime in Egypt shifted towards greater authoritarianism, the plan to get civil society to do all the works turned out difficult to implement, as a former Minister recalled:

The governor of Giza was informed there were Egyptian staff working for a foreign agency running around asking people questions without authorization....I had to say to GIZ, 'there are procedures we all have to abide by, whether we like them or not...and they are, 'before you go in and apply a survey or have a focus group, you've to have a paper from a public agency saying that the governor knows that you have authorization''

²⁶ The amount of aid for the entire region for the whole period 2014-2020 was around £15bn, and DG NEAR was only allowed to work on areas where there was political unanimity by member states. So in Egypt, cooperation was restricted to non-sensitive sectors, ruling out police, military, and security

As more civil society actors struggled to get authorization to work for GIZ, or lacked the capabilities to meet the EU stringent procurement requirements, GIZ changed tact and sought to delegate more of the project implementation to the Governorates. Hence, half of the PDP funds in the form of 60 grants from €10,000 to €300,000 went to NGOs and CDAs. The other half went to capacitate the Governorates and implement infrastructure development projects through the Governorates. To this purpose, the Governorate officials were taken into visits abroad to be shown the participatory approach, and technical Urban Upgrading Units (UUUs) were set up in each Governorate, and the staff was trained to carry on Participatory Needs Assessment (PAN) workshops, issue competitive tenders, and award and monitor building contracts. As well as this, GIZ continued to collaborate on policy matters with the Ministries.

GIZ was particularly proud of a one-off project co-financed with a \$5 million grant awarded by the Bill & Melinda Gates foundation in 2010 to upgrade some Zabaleen (“garbage people” in Arabic) cities, which were well-known for the fact that their inhabitants had been running a large informal garbage recycling operation from their houses for more than 70 years. Competing with inefficient formal waste collection services, the Zabbaleen gathered the waste of Cairo's inhabitants in a door-to-door service for an informal fee and afterward transported the waste by donkey carts or pick-up trucks to their homes. From their homes, the Zabaleen, the “poor of the poor”, managed more than a third of the solid waste that was daily produced in Greater Cairo. A senior officer of the Gates foundation said:

As the world undergoes the largest wave of urban growth in history, we believe there is an opportunity for city governments and the urban poor to work together to find solutions that will address their common problems.

As part of this project, GIZ had entered into a contract with the Qalyubeya Governorate: in exchange for cost-free capital investment and capability-building, the Governorate committed to contribute public land to build waste management facilities and give GIZ access to the Garbage Cities - “this project stands as a model for cooperation between the Governorate and civil society, said the Governor of Qalyubeya in 2014.²⁷ The project completion got two years delayed because it took time to implement its inclusive approach and turn the poor “from being beneficiaries into partners”²⁸. Still, the project went on to receive the 2016 Guangzhou International Award for Urban Innovation. But by then, the Gates foundation had decided the complexity of the urban development made the sector not a good fit for their charitable activities, and the foundation had withdrawn from the sector²⁹:

They [Gates Foundation] like to eradicate things, things you can measure and quantify. Bill Gates would ask us questions like, ‘can I buy all the slums? What’s the difference between a good and a bad slum?’ They wanted something simple, we were offering complexity...urban development is one step forward, two steps backwards, not a linear process. They wanted to find what would be the silver bullet, and there was none... it just didn’t fit with their thinking.

²⁷ GIZ 2014. Integrated Community Based Solid Waste Management in Qalyubeya. A Challenge in Greater Cairo Region. Video Interview. Participatory Development Programme in Urban Areas

²⁸ Walker, M, 2012. “Voices of Change”: A Trip through Dharavi. January Impatient Optimists. Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

²⁹ Urban development was, however, to be recognised as a sector for aid after the 2016 UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) in Quito, and the adoption of the New Urban Agenda

NIF-South 25

NIF-South-25 was first approved in 2012 by the European Commission, and then reapproved in 2014. It was a form of 'delegated cooperation' by which the European Commission trusted on its partners, AFD and EIB, the responsibility to deliver the project. The basic idea was that by making grants available for technical assistance and delivery of social equipment and infrastructure, the Egyptian authorities could be motivated to borrow additional funds to further upgrade the urban informal areas and create credit lines to support SME participation in community development projects. With a total cost of €170m, the program relied on a €33.5m NIF grant and loans from EIB (€45bn) and AFD (€40bn). A common denominator of the EIB and the AFD components was the use of SFD as the implementation agency. Still the value chain would not stop at SFD in that this public agency was expected to sign framework agreements with the Governorates/UUUs, which would be responsible for organizing participatory workshops with local communities to identify local needs and for procuring the consultants and contractors who would do the work (**Exhibit 14**).

AFD: Unplanned Areas and Slums Upgrading Programme (UASAP)

By 2015, the loan element of the AFD project, the Unplanned Areas and Slums Upgrading Programme (UASAP), was happening faster than anticipated in that the Egyptian state had no problems with asking for loans so as to finance credit lines to SMEs. To implement the loan element, the AFD had to agree that the local banks rather than SFD could choose the SMEs receiving credits, but AFD asked for SFD to stay responsible for ensuring the recipients were in line with the AFD standards (**Exhibit 15**). More complicated turned out to be the implementation of the grant element, which focused on upgrades of informal areas. At the crux of the delay was opposition raised by the Institute for National Security to the wording in the agreements, in particular the endorsement of 'decentralization'. That term may have made sense in 2012 in the aftermath of the Arab Spring when the project was agreed with the Ministry of International Cooperation. But since 2015, the broadness of the term 'decentralization' and implicit political meanings were not welcomed by the Egyptian authorities. Finding a solution for this problems was seen by the European Commission as the job of AFD - "*under the philosophy of blending facility, the bank is the project promotor. They're responsible for the project, it's no longer at the European Commission. Ok, it's approved by NIF board, the member states, but if something goes wrong, basically it's the bank*", said an EU official. In turn, from the perspective of the AFD officials, the project should be seen as a SFD project, even if it was controlled by AFD as an official said:

It's important this is a SFD project. No matter what fantasy of an integrated urban project I may have, it's not me who bears the responsibility and who manages it. As long as it meets our requirements, SFD has the final say. It's also up to us to be intelligent to make them want to go in the same direction and see the value of the concepts like town planning, for example.

EIB: Community Development Programme (CDP)

The EIB component of NIF-South-25, so-called Community Development Programme (CDP), had also run into problems. The scope of CDP was broad, ranging from the completion of unfinished urban settlements and infrastructure development in informal areas

to making credit lines available to SMEs and self-help housing improvement programs (**Exhibit 16a**). Yet, SFD struggled to formulate plans that complied with the bank's environmental and social standards, its zero tolerance policy on fraud or corruption as well as the banks strict policies on transparency, good governance, procurement, and stakeholder engagement. A host of legal, administrative and project-related issues that ensued seemed to keep delaying project implementation. An EIB official explained,

It's not our project, it's a SFD project. The credit line is intermediated by SFD but the funds going to the SMEs are intermediated by local banks ...we have to ensure no gaps between our approach and SFD, SFD and banks, and banks and SMEs, which makes it complex from an operational and legal point of view...the other thing this project is doing is investing in community infrastructure. And again, the funds are channelled to SFD, which in turn channels them to the Governorates who execute... financing SMEs and community infrastructure are very different lines of business that in EIB are run by different divisions, which leads to a quite complex operational architecture and a complex institutional framework. The EU grant further complicates because you have a layer of EU criteria

By 2015, the EIB appointed an international consultant, VNG, to offer technical assistance to SFD to establish a project preparation and implementation unit (PPIU) within SFD (**Exhibit 16b**). The plan was that PPIU would be capable to identify sub-projects and develop them up together with the Governorates technical units up to the point they were investment-ready propositions. This is, that they were capable of passing the appraisal process according to the EIB requirements that projects needed to be delivered "on time, within budget, and according to international standards". But the fact the consultant had been procured directly by the bank and not by SFD (as in the AFD project) was another source of delays– "whatever we tell the consultant, he will not listen, he will listen to EIB, the client", said a SFD official.

Complicating matters, the EIB project had been conceived as a common basket that combined a grant and a loan to be disbursed at the same time. Yet, the Egyptian Parliament refused to ratify agreements to loans for slum upgrade projects or technical assistance because they did not generate revenue, and the project stalled - there was a need to break the 'catholic marriage between loan and grant', said one SFD official. An EIB official recognised that when the project was agreed with the Ministry of International Cooperation "there were many unknowns that had to be resolved". But the EU and SFD were increasingly frustrated with, in their view, the EIB's inability to act quick to resolve the problems; one official said

Luxembourg is interested in rules, regulations, the loan, the tender, the interest rate, the milestones of the disbursement, the pari passu loan-grant agreement ...let me be frank, the EIB is not a development bank, it's an investment bank, this is the whole story.

As heads of the EU delegation in Egypt, Luca and Stephane were fully aware of the grand challenge they were facing. The speed at which the informal settlements were being upgraded was not commensurate at all with the rapid growth of Greater Cairo. There were also no signs the Egyptian state planned to reverse its shift back towards authoritarianism. If anything, it

was becoming more and more difficult to engage with local NGOs and civil servants, and carry on participatory development approaches. This was a problem in that the promotion of participation of civil society, decentralization, transparency, and gender equality, were central to the 'good governance' principles espoused by EIB, AFD and other development banks.

Still, the EU officials had some reasons to be optimistic. GIZ PDP had been completed. Of course the idea of implementing the whole project using NGOs and Community Development Associations had to be abandoned half-way, and more than 50% of the project scope had been implemented through the Governorates. But by creating technical units within the Governorates, GIZ felt the project had developed local capabilities in a sustainable way, and the Governorates agreed – “we and GIZ, it's a catholic marriage”, said a Governorate official. Yet, some critics said PDP was still seen by and large as “*German project*”, and this had more disadvantages than advantages than when an Egyptian agency like ISDF or the Housing Ministry was at the forefront of the implementation – “*did GIZ PDP worked on a single market? None, because it's too complicated ...we've to do it through the Governorates, there are land issues, infrastructure issues, contracting issues, no donor can go into that .. they [GIZ] had to give the money to the government to do it, but they didn't want to.*” Or has another critic summarised, *civil society are good in some things, but they're not good in everything*. Still, an external monitoring mission went on to praise the extent to which GIZ had empowered the civil society in project identification and execution. More disappointing was the fact the Egyptian government had no plans to scale up the GIZ approach – “*PDP is a long-term, small-scale approach to show that participatory development works and get the local administration used to it and slowly anchor it into their way of working...but we still have high ranking officers in the Housing Ministry that say, 'we know what has to be done'... we cannot impose a participatory approach...we want to support development through the policies of the national government*”, said a EU official.

The grant element of the AFD project too was moving along after a solution was agreed to tackle the objection of the Egyptian authorities to mention the word 'decentralization' and the participation of 'civil society organizations'. As one EU official explained,

when the discussion came as to what should be the role of civil society, it was very difficult to agree on an appropriate wording... in the end, I told the guys (AFD and SFD) that we had to change the words, but not the practices...because without changing the wording, we would not be able to sign the contract. But changing the wording does not mean we change our methodology of working...we will work with civil society, but we will not write it down.

Getting the changes to the wording agreed by all the Egyptian authorities took, however, over two years– “*we have no influence to accelerate the process. When Saudis support Egypt with billions, they can. But when we're talking about millions, forget it,*” said a EU official. Still, once this obstacle was out the way, SFD became empowered to implement the project. To meet the AFD requirements, SFD established technical units at the Governorates and provided technical assistance to train them to use NGOs to assess the needs and establish priorities; to follow World Bank standards in dealings with people affected by construction works; to launch tenders and award contracts under strict EU procurement rules; and to

organise public hearing sessions to deal with any grievances. Since SFD was a local agency, the Security Authority was less worried of interaction with the civil society – *“with SFD in the loop, magically the funds become local funds... it's always the problem of the foreign component of the project that creates scrutiny from the authorities”*, said a EU official. Still, implementation was a protracted process and the project would not be fully completed before 2021. First, 2 years were required for SFD to set up project implementation units (PIUs) within the Governorates and get the PIUs to identify over 50 priority infrastructure projects in conformance with AFD/SFD development criteria, and get the AFD head office to sign off over 10 framework agreements between SFD and the Governorates. As well as this, the PIUs had to train the technical directorates within the Governorate (roads, water and waste, schools), the entities that would be actually preparing the tender documents and awarding the contracts, following the AFD procurement rules. And no tender could be published on local newspapers or a contract awarded without first the AFD head office issuing a no-objection notice. But no-cost extensions were normal– *“It's actually extremely rare if a development project is implemented according to the initial timeframe,”* said a EU official

More complicated was getting the EIB project to move forward. By 2018, the local EU officials thought the project was a lost case, *“after hundreds of hours talking by phone and meetings, we managed to modify the contribution agreement, agree with legal and operations departments in EU and EIB headquarters, documents going around for many months...the institutional set up has changed, but nothing has happened...there's a friction between the stakeholders, there's no confidence.. they [EIB] cannot come here every 6 months, and try to implement the project. This is crazy, it will never work... (but) nobody wants to take responsibility of saying, 'this is not working'”*. Still, the EIB and SFD had not given up. After many years of talks, they agreed to use the grant element to develop infrastructure in informal areas where the Governorates wanted to encourage job creation through SMEs, thereby recreating the linkage between the loan and the grant in the spirit the original agreement. And SFD now expected a new agreement would be ratified before the end of the year between the Ministry of International Cooperation, SFD and the EIB board, and some works to be concluded by 2021, including the refurbishment of almost 20 schools. And to show its commitment to urban development, by 2018, the EIB had even supplemented the SFD project budget with an extra €15m grant earmarked for infrastructure development³⁰. **(Exhibit 17)**

Even more complex was the situation in the unsafe, unplanned areas which could not be the target of EU schemes since international donors ruled out any finance towards projects linked with forced evictions – *“forcing people to move somewhere shouldn't be done by international agencies. I guess it's a necessity to do that in some areas that aren't inhabitable...but why getting in this politically-sensitive ground when there is so much need to work in other communities areas that are unplanned but safe to live”*, said a donor. This left ISDF alone in the search for domestic funds to upgrade these areas, estimated to be around 10-15% of the informal areas in Cairo. Facing pressure from the President Al-Sisi to

³⁰<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fkhGIHLsgWM&list=UUMeYPU1YfXjxsUa6QXWsfjg&index=12990>

eliminate all unsafe areas by 2018³¹, ISDF turned on to collaborate with the Housing Ministry and public agencies such as the Tahya Misr Fund in relocations of the poor to new cities- the Tahya Misr Fund alone was funding a quarter of the costs of El Asmarat. This left ISDF exposed to criticism, especially after the decision to bulldoze the Maspero Triangle, an old neighbourhood in the heart of Cairo. But ISDF officials claimed the critiques were unfair. Calling many of the Maspero residents 'trespassers' since the land had been acquired by private investors in the 60s, officials argued the demolition process was necessary - "*Maspero Triangle is one of the biggest slums in Egypt, where there have been plenty of cases of urban decay and untenable living situations,*" said the head of ISDF in 2018. As well as this, other ISDF officials claimed the eviction process ("immediate intervention" in their own words) had respected human rights even if in the end a decision had been made that the historical value of the neighbourhood should not get in the way of demolition; officials said

We got a decree from the Supreme Council that we were going to replan this neighbourhood...everybody had a chance to prove ownership...people were given 3 options, either move to El Asmarat, get cash based on the assessed valuation, or stay and there would be some provision. The younger generation, more mobile, took the money; the less economically active moved to Asmarat, and the poorest of the poor, around 200 families, chose to stay...we mustn't be too harsh on governments ... they cannot be as participatory as we would want...they've time pressures, people-demand pressures, budget-spending pressures, show-results pressures that people outside the government do not have...they live by different constraints.. if they don't move fast enough, the slums move faster

We didn't take any decision in Maspero till we sat with the residents and surveyed them to know their needs... we decided not to force people to do anything... we've 4,500 families registered in our statistics, but those living there are 1,000 only. When we provided apartments for 27 families in Asmarat and people saw we fulfilled our promise, the number of families asking to have apartments raised to 460...we allowed them to change their needs more than one timewe paid a lot of financial compensations... since families moved to Asmarat, we literally developed their lives, socially, environmentally, psychologically, professionally and economically...the problem is the communication between the Egyptian media and the western world, not the communication between us and the citizens

In sum, ISDF officials insisted Egypt had turned a page from its past history of failed forced evictions to new towns in the desert led by Governors eager to rescue people from hazards, but ignorant of the need of preparing people to move and prepare the places – as a former ISDF said, '*our governors are very powerful men, many are former generals, and to suddenly have to deal with these ideas - 'delays' from their point of view - was difficult*'. But armed with money, support from central government, as well as international support, ISDF felt it had the upper hand on negotiations with governors although not everyone agreed – "*on paper there's no forced evictions...but what has happened until they've agreed to it, that is something not talked about – intimidation, I'm not afraid to say it*", said a NGO official.

³¹ AIHAYah TV Network, 16 May 2016 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rzyzGGneDjU>

Disagreements notwithstanding, the mind-set in central government seemed to be shifting. Central to this shift was a 10-year-long, close partnership of UN Habitat with the Housing Ministry. Co-located in the Government offices, UN Habitat officials were the first to say they were 'in bed' with Government. Their aim was to have an impact by leveraging their experience supporting the UN agenda to eradicate poverty and develop slums. In particular, UN Habitat was collaborating with the government to redevelop a new 2050 strategic vision for Cairo; decentralise urban development; and develop the slums. The participatory approach was high in the UN Habitat agenda, and the UN Habitat espoused those principles in projects funded by international donors. For example, to allow local communities to take a leading role in shaping their immediate environment towards safer neighbourhoods for women and girls, between 2012 and 2015, UN Habitat got associated with local NGOs as part of a small slum upgrade project in Cairo co-funded by a UN Women Programme grant and a \$105,000 Ford Foundation grant (**Exhibit 18**). Yet, UN Habitat was fully aware not everyone in government welcomed the participatory approach. And so, seen almost as a government entity itself, UN Habitat had limits in the extent to which it could be critical of government. Still, UN Habitat staff argued it was important to be close to the politicians and to engage government in every step of development until government could take the lead:

We pilot projects and then come up with lessons learnt that become proposals that hopefully are integrated into law reform... we give policy advice, but we do not have to call it policy advice. We call it technical advice...on decentralization, on reforming current systems, on methodologies, on legal frameworks, on enhancing capacity, on rearranging organizational structure. These are our mandates...create an enabling environment for development

Further, others observed the ideas of participatory development were becoming popular


in Egypt, there is now a core group of young, engaged architects, urban planners who have been doing really interesting work. And because those folks often have small architectural companies, many of them now are able to get contracts with the Housing Ministry, UN Habitat and GIZ, and the ideas and skills set are travelling in that way.

But at the same time UN Habitat and donors saw government policy changing even if slowly, the influence of China in the Egyptian affairs was growing fast, and Chinese contractors were being awarded multi-billion contracts negotiated at closed doors to build New Cairo, which would be financed by commercial loans to the Egyptian government provided by Chinese banks. This megaproject was a massive gamble given the Egypt's history of unsuccessful desert development projects. And yet, when it could take ten years to upgrade a slum, and Cairo's population was growing exponentially, any approach prioritising institutions building was a hard sell. What could be changed in urban development in Egypt, and how to best use the workshop for that purpose, was the question facing Lucas and Stephane and all the workshop participants more generally. Could their job be more than just pushing and processing paper? Could they facilitate policy dialog?

Exhibit 1 – Egypt's position in the Central Mediterranean migrant routes

Central Mediterranean migrant routes

-  Countries of origin
-  Transit countries
-  Main migrant routes
-  Migrant routes



Source: Unicef

BBC

Exhibit 2- Egypt – EU Partnership Priorities 2017-2020

ASSOCIATION
BETWEEN
THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND EGYPT

The Association Council

Brussels, 16 June 2017
(OR. en)

NOTE

From:	General Secretariat of the Council
To:	Delegations
Subject:	EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities 2017-2020

EU-EGYPT PARTNERSHIP PRIORITIES 2017-2020

I. Introduction


The general framework of the cooperation between the EU and Egypt is set by the Association Agreement which was signed in 2001 and entered into force in 2004. While all elements of the Association Agreement remain in effect, this document sets the priorities jointly defined between the EU and Egypt in light of the revised European Neighbourhood Policy that will guide the partnership for the next 3 years.

These Partnership Priorities aim to address common challenges facing the EU and Egypt, to promote joint interests and to guarantee long-term stability on both sides of the Mediterranean. The Partnership Priorities are guided by a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and the respect of human rights. They also aim to reinforce cooperation in support of Egypt's "Sustainable Development Strategy – Vision-2030".

Exhibit 3a- The growth of Greater Cairo - Cairo vision 2050 (2007/08). The Strategic Urban Development Plan of Greater Cairo Region (GCR). General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP), Ministry of Housing, Egypt

Raising living condition to the international level

The urban mass in Cairo




Unsafe
Planned
Unplanned

The main urban mass of GCR is categorized into three types:

Planned Areas Unsafe Areas Unplanned Areas

- Preserving the **planned areas** in Cairo and Giza by setting building conditions
- Dealing with **unsafe** and **unplanned areas** through an detailed plan for upgrading and a specified time frame



Raising living standards to an international level

Better Administration of the Region

Housing and Slums

Improvement of Environment and Increasing Green Areas







Roads and Transportation


Drinking Water and Sanitation

Problems and Challenges

The problem is not the size of GCR but the maldistribution of population


GCR and Global Cities: a Comparison of Sizes

	Paris 11 million
	Greater Seoul 22.5 million
	Tokyo 33 million
	Greater Cairo 16 million
	Mexico City 16 million
	New York 13 million



75% of the GCR's population is condensed within a 20 km-diameter circle

Exhibit 3b- Governorates of Greater Cairo including formal and informal settlements.
Sabry, S (2009). *Egypt's Informal Areas: Inaccurate and Contradictory Data in Cairo's Informal Areas. Between Urban Challenges and Hidden Proposals. Facts. Voices. Visions.* GTZ



**Exhibit 4 – Informal Areas: Informal Settlements and Slums in Sims, D 2002
The Case of Cairo, Egypt. GTZ**




Exhibit 5– Tadamun 2015. Egypt's New Cities: Neither Just nor Efficient,
<http://www.tadamun.co/egypts-new-cities-neither-just-efficient/?lang=en#.XeFM5JKjjA>




Exhibit 6– Khalil, Amira and Yahia Shawkat. 2016. “The Built Environment Budget FY 2015/16: An Analysis of Spatial Justice in Egypt.” <http://www.10tooba.org/en/?p=172>.





Exhibit 7 Darwish, A. 2016 Land Governance in Informal Settlements in Egypt. – Informal Settlement Development Fund (ISDF). March

National Strategy		
Participatory Planning	Short Term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dealing with Unsafe Areas Upgrading slum areas without force evacuation. (except for grade one which where there are life threatening conditions). 3 years Action Plan
	Medium Term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> "Needs Map" for Informal Areas Supporting right to housing 5-10 years
	Long Term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Providing Security and decent life Preemptive Measures New Communities
Short Term Plan	Sector Housing finance (40%), General water, sewage, electricity and sanitation sector (40%), Public administration (10%), Other social services (10%)	Theme Urban services and housing for the poor (70%), Other urban development (15%), Poverty strategy, analysis and monitoring (15%)



Principles

Egypt Constitution 2014 - Article (78)

“The State shall **ensure the citizens' right to adequate, safe and healthy housing** in a manner which preserves human dignity and achieves social justice”

The State shall also **devise a comprehensive national plan to address the problem of unplanned slums**, which includes re-planning, provision of infrastructure and utilities, and improvement of the quality of life and public health. In addition, the State shall guarantee the provision of resources necessary for implementing such plan within a specified period of time.

Land Titling Laws in Egypt

- Law No. 89 year 1998 added to Law No. 148 year 2006.
- Decision of the Prime minister No. 2041 year 2006 for buildings compensation

Exhibit 8 - AFD Group Financing: how does it work?
<https://www.afd.fr/en/loans-afds-main-financing-tool>



Exhibit 9a - Aid Effectiveness



WORKING PARTY ON AID EFFECTIVENESS



Accelerating progress in aid effectiveness: from here to 2011

what is aid effectiveness and why does it matter?

Aid effectiveness is about value for money – it is about managing aid in a way that maximises its impact on development. Donors and developing countries have made many commitments – to their own taxpayers and to each other – for progress on development. Aid effectiveness is about delivering on those commitments.

At the beginning of the 21st Century, it became clear that increases in aid financing were not producing the impact expected. While interest in aid effectiveness was not new (see box: Milestones on the way to aid effectiveness), an unprecedented consensus emerged on what needed to be done to produce better results. This consensus underpins the agreements in the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008).

These aid effectiveness agreements – spearheaded by the OECD-DAC and the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness – engage the whole spectrum of development stakeholders and are the only international framework on the quality of aid. They provide the essential counterpart to the UN-led agreements on development goals and to global commitments on development finance. At the same time, the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness – supported by the OECD-DAC – is the most inclusive and credible international forum for promoting the principles embodied in these compacts.

MILESTONES ON THE WAY TO AID EFFECTIVENESS

1996: The DAC issues the report *Shaping the 21st Century: The Role of Development Cooperation*, setting out the basic concepts of aid effectiveness.

2000: MDG-8 of the Millennium Declaration calls for a Global Partnership for Development.

2002: The Monterrey Financing for Development Conference sets funding targets to achieve the MDGs and calls for a more effective way of giving aid to ensure these resources have the maximum impact possible on development.

2003: At the High Level Forum on Harmonization (HLF-1, Rome), donors agree to improve in-country co-ordination and to reduce transaction costs for aid recipients.

2005: At the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris (HLF-2), donors and developing countries endorse the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, with 56 action-oriented commitments to improve aid quality that will be monitored (in 2005, 2007 and 2010) against 14 targets.

2008: In Accra, at the Third High Level forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-3), DAC and non-DAC donors, middle-income countries, low-income countries, civil society organisations, parliamentarians and global partnerships agree on the Accra Agenda for Action – a framework to accelerate achievement of the Paris commitments.

What has aid effectiveness achieved?

The aid effectiveness agenda has drawn strong support from developing countries, civil society organisations, parliamentarians, global partnerships and donors worldwide. It has also contributed to progress against several MDGs, helping to produce impact more quickly and at a lower cost. And while it is essentially about the quality of aid, it has underpinned significant increases in annual aid flows: from US\$60 billion in 2002 to US\$120 billion in 2008.

Growing support for the Paris Declaration principles has produced changes in the way donors and developing countries do business. It is now the norm for aid recipients to discuss their national development strategies with

their parliaments and electorates (ownership), and for donors to support these strategies (alignment). Donors are working more and more to streamline their efforts in-country (harmonisation). Developed and developing countries are pinning their actions to clear goals, with progress measured against concrete targets (managing for development results), and they are holding each other responsible for achieving these goals (mutual accountability). CSOs and NGOs have become active players in ensuring that accountability is widespread and inclusive.

The Paris Declaration's call for transparency has also sparked significant improvements in the availability and quality of data on aid flows. As a result, electorates in donor and developing countries increasingly have the information they need to hold their executives to account, and executives have the information they need to identify and exploit potential cost savings.

The Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action have also helped to zero in on the quality of aid provided to countries in fragile situations (*Dili Declaration*, April 2010), as well as on cooperation among developing and middle income countries (*Bogotá statement*, March 2010).

Still room for improvement

Almost all donors and some 60 developing countries took place in the 2008 Paris Declaration monitoring survey, which shows strong progress since the first, baseline survey in 2005. This progress is most evident in commitments to untie aid, improve the quality of developing countries' public financial management systems, and improve the quality of technical assistance. Yet there is still much ground to cover to meet these commitments fully. The Survey shows moderate progress in recording aid in countries' budgets, reducing parallel implementation units (that deliver aid outside national systems) and improving the predictability of aid (ensuring that aid turns up on time, in the amounts and forms expected). Nonetheless, progress was very weak in several areas, in particular in improving the quality of countries' national development plans, donors' use of countries' financial management and procurement systems, co-ordination of missions and studies among donors, and creation of frameworks to monitor and account for results.

The due date for the Paris Declaration targets was set for 2010. At the HLF-4, the results of the final monitoring survey will provide a scorecard on progress. To accelerate impact, the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness has joined forces with some 10 focus countries where they will bring all parties together to unblock barriers to achieving aid effectiveness in priority areas identified by each country. Much of this work centres on strengthening county systems and overcoming the resistance – on the part of donors – to using these systems.

The Fourth High Level Forum and beyond

In Korea in November 2011, at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4), Ministers and specialists will not only take stock of what has been achieved against the targets set out in the Paris Declaration – they will use this yardstick to set the aid quality framework for the years remaining until the MDG target date of 2015. What issues will be at the top of the agenda? Developing countries have already named their priorities for the HLF-4: predictability of aid, use of country systems, removal of policy conditionality, country-driven capacity development, mutual accountability and reduction of transactions costs. Drawing from the discussions and analysis around these topics, the HLF-4 will set the agenda for the years to follow. It will look beyond aid to identify the wider issues that are central to development effectiveness – and to determine how we will monitor progress on these in order to hold everyone to account.

Exhibit 9b - Paris Declaration: Participating Countries and Organizations

Appendix B:

List of Participating Countries and Organisations

Participating Countries

Albania	Australia	Austria	Bangladesh
Belgium	Benin	Bolivia	Botswana
[Brazil]*	Burkina Faso	Burundi	Cambodia
Cameroon	Canada	China	Congo D.R.
Czech Republic	Denmark	Dominican Republic	Egypt
Ethiopia	European Commission	Fiji	Finland
France	Gambia, The	Germany	Ghana
Greece	Guatemala	Guinea	Honduras
Iceland	Indonesia	Ireland	Italy
Jamaica	Japan	Jordan	Kenya
Korea	Kuwait	Kyrgyz Republic	Lao PDR
Luxembourg	Madagascar	Malawi	Malaysia
Mali	Mauritania	Mexico	Mongolia
Morocco	Mozambique	Nepal	Netherlands
New Zealand	Nicaragua	Niger	Norway
Pakistan	Papua New Guinea	Philippines	Poland
Portugal	Romania	Russian Federation	Rwanda
Saudi Arabia	Senegal	Serbia and Montenegro	Slovak Republic
Solomon Islands	South Africa	Spain	Sri Lanka
Sweden	Switzerland	Tajikistan	Tanzania
Thailand	Timor-Leste	Tunisia	Turkey
Uganda	United Kingdom	United States of America	Vanuatu
Vietnam	Yemen	Zambia	

*To be confirmed.

More countries than listed here have endorsed the Paris Declaration. For a full and up to date list please consult www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parideclaration/members.

Participating Organisations

African Development Bank	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
Asian Development Bank	Commonwealth Secretariat
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP)	Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB)
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)	Education for All Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI)
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)	European Investment Bank (EIB)
Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria	G24
Inter-American Development Bank	International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)	International Organisation of the Francophonie
Islamic Development Bank	Millennium Campaign
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)	Nordic Development Fund
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)	Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
OPEC Fund for International Development	Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
United Nations Development Group (UNDG)	World Bank

Exhibit 11 - Cairo informal areas covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy




Exhibit 12a - THE GIZ Participatory Development Programme in Greater Cairo



Participatory Development Programme in Urban Areas (PDP)

Context

Egypt's cities are growing rapidly, often in the absence of any governmental urban planning. Around 20 million people currently live in the Greater Cairo Region, the majority (around 60 per cent) in informal, underserved and densely built areas. There is a lack of basic social services and physical infrastructure, such as, health centres, schools, youth centres, access to drinking water, sewage and waste disposals, as well as, access to job opportunities. The large population density results in high environmental pollution. Generally, the residents develop their habitat independently without obtaining building permits, which often results in their deprivation of public services and infrastructure. Due to the major changes in Egypt, residents expect quick and tangible improvements in their living situation, and the government and civil society organisations can hardly accommodate the increasing needs and expectations of the poor urban population.

The PDP is an Egyptian-German development measure implemented by the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities, and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). It started in 2004 and it is now in its third phase (2010- 2018), with core-financing by BMZ, as well as financing by the European Union (EU) and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) with a total amount of EUR 49 million. In addition, the PDP receives LE 1 million annual contribution of the Egyptian government to the programme.

Objective

Public administration and civil society organizations collaborate in improving services and environmental conditions for the poor urban population.

Approach

The development measure is operating on all levels, cooperating with decision makers on the national, regional, and local levels on upgrading informal areas. The PDP disseminates and anchors participatory methods and instruments for integrated urban development through relevant national institutes, local administrations, and civil society.

In addition to this, the PDP builds capacities of local administration, youth representatives, local leaders, NGOs and the private sector to support them in enhancing the services and environmental conditions in their areas.

To support urgent and concrete measures, the PDP awards grants for small and medium-scale projects to improve the living conditions and upgrade physical, social and socio-economic infrastructure in nine selected informal urban areas in Greater Cairo Region. Complementary grants are given to the governorates for small and medium scale infrastructure projects in the selected areas. Youth, women and civil society organisations are actively engaged in the planning, as well as, in the implementation, operation and maintenance of the measures.

An integrated community-based solid waste management system is introduced in two poor urban areas in Qalyubeya Governorate, taking into consideration the needs of informal waste collectors and recyclers already operating in the sector. The issue of climate change and its consequences for informal urban areas is raised for the first time in Egypt, in order to, increase awareness and promote initiatives improving the resilience of the poor urban population.

Results

As a result of the programme's work, on the governorate, district and local levels participatory approaches are applied in dealing with informal urban areas. Decision makers are informed about the situation and are aware of methodologies and instruments to improve the livelihoods of the local population and alleviate urban poverty. The ability of the local administration, civil society and private sector organisations to provide more needs-oriented and coordinated services in informal urban areas has increased.

Development priorities are identified by local residents, enabling the application of participatory urban development methodologies and reducing social marginalization. In close cooperation between local administration, civil society and the private sector, concrete solutions for improving the social and infrastructural services of informal urban areas are sought, and concrete measures implemented, enhancing the role of civil society and private sector. As a result of the grant scheme, the living conditions of the urban poor have been improved.

Environmental conditions in selected informal areas are enhanced through the implementation of an agreed-upon solid waste management strategy by local NGOs and public administration. The improved waste management systems will not only benefit the local population, but also have demonstration character for other areas in Egypt. In 2014, the Advisory Board on Cities and Climate Change (AB-CCC) was established and held several stakeholder meetings, contributing to knowledge exchange and encouraging collaboration. Additionally, participatory pilot projects were initiated for protecting houses against the increasing summer heat ("architectural measures") and for introducing income generating urban agriculture schemes to the communities.

Partner
Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities

Contact
Dr. Günther Wehngöhl
Programme Coordinator
c/o GIZ-Cairo Office
4D, El-Gazira Street 11211
Zamalek, Cairo
Internet: www.egypt-urban.net, www.giz.de/egypt

Tel: +20 2 24 04 17 24
Email: pdp@gizeg.com



IDENTIFICATION

Title/Number	Upgrading of Informal Areas in the Greater Cairo Region - ENPI/2011/22764		
Total cost	EU contribution: EUR 20,000,000 Parallel financing by <i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)</i> / Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation / Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation		
Aid method / Method of implementation	Project approach – Standalone project approach Delegated Agreement with GIZ Indirect Centralised Management		
DAC-code	43030	Sector	Urban Development and Management

Indicative budget and calendar

The total cost of the programme is estimated at EUR 20,000,000. The total EU contribution to the programme is EUR 20,000,000, to be done through a Delegated Agreement with GIZ of EUR 19,700,000 and EU centralised management of EUR 300,000 (audit and evaluation budget line, as specified below).

There will be parallel financing from other stakeholders as specified in the following table:

Name of Organization:	Contribution
German Technical Cooperation	EUR 1,000,000 confirmed EUR 1,000,000 request in process
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (Solid Waste Management Strategy, only in Qalyubeya)	USD 5,000,000 (approximately EUR 3,700,000)
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation	Estimated at LE 4,000,000 plus office space
EU	EUR 20,000,000

Component	Estimated costs (in EUR)	Implementation
1. Development of informal areas including fund management	12,000,000	Grants and service contracts. Physical and social infrastructure interventions, socio-economic and environmental activities through fund
2. Capacity building including technical assistance	5,600,000	Service contracts (consultants) and technical assistance
Operating Costs (7%)	1,400,000	Overheads for GIZ
Audit, evaluations	300,000	Service contracts
Visibility	150,000	Service contracts. PR campaigns, publications etc.
Contingencies	550,000	
TOTAL	20,000,000	

Exhibit 12b - Participatory Needs Assessment in Informal Areas. 2013, Participatory Development programme in Urban Areas. Center for Development Studies



CDS researcher doing a community map with the local community during fieldwork



GIZ representative introducing the PNA to the local community in the Public Day in Ain Shams

The tables below show the number of FGD's and KII's conducted and total number of participants involved:

Table 3.2 Number of KIIs and FGDs conducted in Cairo Governorate

Research Tool	KIIs	FGDs
Ain Shams	62	33
Ezbet El-Nasr	34	46

Table 3.3 Total number of participants in Cairo Governorate

Total Interviews	# of men	# of women	# of youth	Total
Ain Shams	152	82	78	312
Ezbet El-Nasr	92	71	68	231




Exhibit 13 – BMZ Marshall Plan with Africa



"We need a paradigm shift; we have to realise that Africa is not the continent of cheap commodities but rather that the people of Africa need infrastructure and a future."

German Development Minister Gerd Müller

A new partnership for development, peace and a better future

A Marshall Plan with Africa

Africa has great potential – potential which goes well beyond abundant natural resources, cultural diversity, entrepreneurial spirit and innovative force. Roughly half of the world's 20 fastest growing economies are in Africa. By 2035, Africa will have the world's biggest potential labour force.

Africa's population is set to double by 2050, accounting then for 20 per cent of the world's population. Africa is where the global markets, workforce and customers of the future will be found. Accordingly, the challenge is to turn to account the continent's potential and provide work and prospects for the young people living there.

The countries of Africa have set themselves a highly ambitious agenda for the socio-economic transformation they need to accomplish.

The agenda sets out that, by 2063, Africa will be "a prosperous [continent] with the means and resources to drive its own development, and

with a sustainable and long-term responsibility for its resources". (Goal 1 of the African Union's [Agenda 2063](#))


In order to help Africa realise this development agenda, we need an entirely new kind of collaboration, a political partnership between equals which offers support for Africa's own agenda. Africa needs African solutions. Therefore, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has taken a new direction in its cooperation with Africa.

The Cornerstones for a [Marshall Plan with Africa](#) initiated by the BMZ were presented in early 2017 for discussion in an online dialogue with academics, businesspeople, and representatives from the Churches, society and politics. These cornerstones have since been used to create the conceptual and strategic framework for the BMZ's Africa policy.

BMZ

2. The essence of the Marshall Plan

The Marshall Plan rests on three pillars, contains more than 100 ideas for reform and is centred round the key issues for development:



In all areas, our focus is on providing far more support to women and girls – both as a cross-cutting priority issue and as a separate priority area in its own right – and on strengthening education and training offers for the young generation.

Through targeted and cross-sectoral initiatives, we want to use the opportunities of digitalisation in all areas of life. We want to develop digital infrastructures and invest in people's abilities and skills. Our goal is to promote the fair and open development of a digitalised world.

Exhibit 14 – NIF-South-25

INTEGRATED AND SUSTAINABLE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

■ SOCIAL SECTOR
Egypt

Integrating informal areas of settlement into the urban pattern and improving basic social services will give a boost to living conditions in the most deprived areas of Cairo.

Egyptian cities contain a large number of slums and squatter settlements, many of which suffer from under-servicing and limited or no land tenure security. Newer informal areas lack access to sewerage and water services. In older informal areas, water, electricity, and especially sewerage networks tend to be heavily overloaded due to very high residential densities. There are an estimated 1,105 slums, squatter and informal settlements in Egypt, housing a total of 15.7 million inhabitants (around a quarter of the total population). Since the January 2011 revolution, there has been a lot more interest from the government and civil society to tackle the problems associated with informal settlements. Egypt has therefore requested assistance in the area of integrated and sustainable housing and community development.

This housing and community development programme covers urban areas in Egypt, in particular Greater Cairo. It can be broadly split into two programmes – the EIB/NIF financed Community Development Programme (CDP) and the AFD/NIF financed Unplanned Areas and Slums Upgrading Programme (UASUP). The CDP encompasses: completion of unfinished urban settlements; micro-credits to support self-help housing improvement programmes; improving the connectivity of electricity, water and sanitation infrastructure for low income and informal settlements; and credit lines to support SME participation in the supply chain of investments in community development. This programme in particular targets Cairo but other major urban centres may also be included. The UASUP focuses on providing public services and utilities, community development activities and implementation of pilot interventions in selected areas.

As a result, basic social services such as health and education and urban services will be improved in the most deprived areas of Cairo. Local development capacities, including local governance and decentralisation capacities, will be strengthened. There will also be better job opportunities because, for example, access to vocational training facilities and SME's access to credit will be facilitated thanks to the project.


The EU grant will leverage approximately €125 million of loans from the International Financial Institutions and will significantly improve the affordability of the envisaged activities for the final beneficiaries. In the absence of the grant, the financial institutions would have very limited prospects to motivate national and local Egyptian authorities to borrow for technical assistance and social services equipment and infrastructures. Thus, the programme and especially its technical assistance part contribute to build Egyptian authority and institutional capacities and to reinvest in upgrading urban areas and community development.

The EIB will ensure the visibility of the European Union contribution in line with EU visibility guidelines via press releases and visibility events for example.



© AFD

Total cost: €170m
NIF grant: €3.5 m (for technical assistance, top up of €30m NIF grant committed 2012)
Lead finance institution: EIB with €45m
Co-financing institutions: AFD with €40m



Integrated and Sustainable Housing and Community Development Programme

Project ID: NIF-South-25

Egyptian cities contain a large number of slums and squatter settlements, many of which suffer from under-servicing and limited or no land tenure security. Newer informal areas lack access to sewer and water services. In older informal areas, water, electricity, and especially sewerage networks tend to be heavily overloaded due to very high residential densities. There are more than 1000 slums, squatter and informal settlements in Egypt, housing more than 15 million inhabitants (around a quarter of the total population).

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The CDP encompasses action such as: the completion of unfinished urban settlements; micro-credits to support self-help housing improvement programmes; improving the connectivity of electricity, water and sanitation infrastructure for low income and informal settlements; and credit lines to support SME participation in the supply chain of investments in community development. This programme in particular targets Cairo but other major urban centres may also be included.

The UASUP covers both unsafe areas (slums) and unplanned areas.

The pre-identified slums suffer from severe housing and environmental deteriorated conditions that are beyond rehabilitation. Here, the focus will be on urban redevelopment and regeneration through the provision of in-situ housing or in the immediate vicinity of existing housing.

The programme also focuses on the provision of new and/or enhanced public services (education, health, youth clubs and cultural activities); the improvement of existing utilities (water, drainage, electricity, solid waste); the upgrading of public open spaces; and environmental interventions.

Exhibit 15 - Unplanned Areas and Slums Upgrading Programme (UASAP)



PUBLIC COMMUNICATION BRIEF ON OPERATION

ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

CEG1043

Unplanned Areas Upgrading and Employment Enhancement Programme in Egypt

Context for the project and strategic issues

Egypt has many challenges to deal with, especially when it comes to creating jobs for young graduates. The problem of unemployment among young people is closely linked to that of the limited development of micro and small-scale enterprises (MSEs). For a significant and growing section of the Egyptian population they provide a means of subsistence. However, despite recent banking reforms, MSEs have only limited access to suitable finance which poses a major obstacle to their development.

Although the Egyptian revolution gave rise to very high expectations as regards freedom, dignity, social justice and sound governance, the level of unemployment has worsened due to the extended crisis especially in disadvantaged areas, which fuels social unrest. Therefore it is crucial that policies are implemented to promote employment so that social cohesion is maintained in the country.

The project's objectives and what is involved

The purpose of the project is to create employment in Egypt and generate income locally. For this to happen, the project will help Egyptian MSEs gain access to credit, and it is also funding small labour-intensive public works projects. This dual component project, run by the Egyptian Social Fund for Development (SFD), aims more specifically:

- to make a credit line available to thousands of MSEs located in impoverished areas throughout Egypt, through on-lending of a 80 million Euro sovereign loan from the AFD to the SFD;
- through labour-intensive projects, to set up and regenerate small, basic infrastructures in four informal settlements of Greater Cairo (Ezbet Khairallah and Al-Zawiya al-Hamra in the governorate of Cairo, Ard El-Lewa and Miet Uqba in the governorate of Gizeh), funded through a donation of 15 million Euros transferred to the AFD by the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) and the European Union (EU).

In order to promote an integrated approach, synergies between these two components are being encouraged. This means that the SFD is contractually bound to lend some of the 80 million Euros to MSEs in the informal settlements.



This project is carried out with the financial assistance of the European Union.
The contents of this document can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.

1/2

Technical assistance, funded from part of the donation transferred to the AFD by the EU, will make it possible to strengthen the capacities of the SFD teams, its financial intermediaries, and the structures responsible for carrying out the works, as well as the capacities of the MSEs (the final beneficiaries).

The parties involved and the modus operandi

The SFD is operating the credit line, and lends directly to the MSEs either directly or through financial intermediaries (banks, microfinance institutions). The SFD is also responsible for carrying out regeneration projects in the informal settlements, in partnership with the governorate of Cairo, the governorate of Gizeh and also the Ministry of State for Urban Renewal and Informal Settlements. The regeneration projects in the informal settlements have not been decided upon in advance, but are being identified through a needs study carried out by a specialist consultancy firm. This study seeks to promote a participatory approach. People living in the informal settlements are given questionnaires to ensure that the projects selected adequately meet their priorities.

Cost and funding

Set up in 1991, the SFD is a para-statal institution which refines itself through lenders via the Ministry of International Cooperation and the Egyptian Central Bank, which explains why it is using the AFD's sovereign loan. Apart from this loan of 80 million Euros, the project is also getting a donation of 15 million Euros transferred to the AFD by the EU, which is being used to fund urban regeneration work as well as technical assistance.

The main results expected

The project is making a direct contribution to boosting the MSEs' productive fabric through the injection of funding and capacity strengthening services. By doing this, it is contributing to investment, job creation, formalization of the informal sector and therefore to growth. According to initial estimates, 80,000 micro-enterprises and 1,250 small-scale enterprises should benefit from credits. Furthermore, approximately 1.2 million people should gain from the regeneration projects in the four informal settlements mentioned earlier.



Exhibit 16a - Integrated and Sustainable Community Development Programme

Egypt: EUR 200m for the Cairo metro line and EUR 45m for community development

14 November 2012 · [f](#) [in](#) [e](#)



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The European Investment Bank (EIB) has signed a first EUR 200m tranche of the EUR 600m loan approved by the Bank for the extension of the Cairo Metro and a EUR 45m loan for a Community Development Programme. Both projects represent the Bank's first response to the new administration's priorities in this sector.

Werner Hoyer, President of the EIB, commented: "With the Arab Spring, Egypt and Europe are embarking on a new era in their relations. The challenge for the new Egyptian government is now to restore confidence in the economy. Developing infrastructure, such as ensuring mobility, and fostering business through the Community Development Programme is key to promoting growth and employment."

Both loans were signed in Cairo today by EIB President Hoyer, Gamal Negm, Deputy Governor, and Nedal Assar, Sub-Governor of the Central Bank of Egypt and, for the Cairo Metro loan, Atta El Sherbiny, Chairman of the National Authority for Tunnels and, for the loan for the Community Development Programme, Ghada Waly, Managing Director of the Social Fund for Development.

The signatures took place during a visit with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Catherine Ashton. Also present were the Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for Industry and Entrepreneurship, Antonio Tajani, and the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle.

The Cairo Metro's expansion will help to reduce traffic congestion and pollution and promote the use of public transport, thus contributing to more sustainable development of the city. The project will extend Line 3 to serve the main transportation corridors of urban greater Cairo, involving 17.7 km of new track and 15 stations. It is intended to enhance mobility and access to jobs and social services, particularly among the poorer citizens of Cairo. The project is being co-financed by the Agence Française de Développement (AFD).

The Borrower is the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Promoter is the National Authority for Tunnels (NAT).

The EUR 45m loan for the Community Development Programme will help extend financing for projects supporting community development, primarily in urban areas, including social and community services, basic infrastructure, housing improvement, as well as microenterprise and SME development. The objective of the programme is the creation of more sustainable communities to improve standards of living and promote employment generation among disadvantaged populations. The Borrower is the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Promoter is the Social Fund for Development (SFD).

Contact

Christof Roche
c.roche@eib.org
 +32 27124129

Khaled Elnimr
k.elnimr@ext.eib.org
 +352 4379 - 70495

Press Office
press@eib.org
 +352 4379 - 21000

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Related tags

project
Reference 2012-161-EN



Supporting the community development in Egypt – Integrated and Sustainable Community Development Programme (ISCDP)

Location

Egypt

Description

The technical assistance operation involves the preparation, identification and elaboration of an investment programme to promote more integrated and sustainable community development in Egypt, in accordance with the development priorities defined by the country's new administration. The programme comprises eligible schemes/sub-projects and is supported by an EIB loan to Egypt's Ministry of Finance and implemented by the country's Social Fund for Development (SFD).

Objectives

The overall objective of the ISCDP is to improve the standard of living of people benefitting from the resulting schemes and sub-projects. To address the priorities of the Egyptian Government, the outputs of the ISCDP should conjointly focus on the provision of new and/or improved housing and increased employment opportunities. However, to encourage sustainability an integrated approach is necessary, so schemes under the ISCDP could also encompass the improvement of social services (e.g. health and education and other community infrastructure, e.g. roads, sewer systems). As such, the portfolio of projects may include (i) support to SMEs and/or the upgrading of existing housing units via the establishment of credit lines and (ii) improvement and creation of new electricity connections, water and sanitation networks and other social infrastructure for existing low income neighbourhoods and informal settlements. The executing agency of such projects, in a first phase, would for the main part be the SFD, but, at later stages, may be expanded to involve other Government Agencies, Civil Society and the Private Sector.

Sector(s)

Infrastructure (Urban Development)

Amount approved

EUR 138,000.00

Status

Completed

Community Development Programme



Reference: 20110207

Release date: 7 October 2011

Promoter – Financial Intermediary

Social Fund for Development

Location

- ▶ [Egypt](#)

Description

An integrated Community Development Programme designed to increase employment opportunities and improve living standards for socially disadvantaged segments of populations living in and around urban centres in Egypt through investments supporting infrastructure and housing.

Objectives

The creation of more sustainable communities and to promote a more integrated approach to spatial planning and development which delivers benefits to constituents over a wide spectrum of the economically and geographically disadvantaged.

Sector(s)

- ▶ [Urban development](#)

Proposed EIB finance (Approximate amount)

EUR 45 million

Total cost (Approximate amount)

EUR 90 million

Environmental aspects


No negative environmental or social impacts are anticipated from the GDP. While it is not possible to carry out a definite evaluation at present, as sub-projects have not been fully defined, it is expected that sub-projects will target areas which have, to date, had a largely negative impact on the environment. Therefore, interventions will contribute positively through the promotion of more environmentally-friendly practices and through the "cleaning up" of neighbourhoods.

Procurement

The project portfolio has yet to be finalised but, once it is, all components will have to comply with prevailing procurement protocols, including meeting the minimum national standards. Local practices will be checked against international and EU standards to ensure propriety and best practice.

Status

Signed - 14/11/2012



Our activities in the Mediterranean neighbourhood



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General enquiries and comments

The EIB is committed to open communication and encourages constructive stakeholder input regarding its activities.

Enquiries and comments concerning the EIB's involvement in a project or the financing facilities, activities, organisation and objectives of the EIB, can be sent to the [EIB Infodesk](#).

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Media enquiries

Media-related enquiries can be addressed to the [EIB Press Office](#). Please also visit our [Media information section](#).

Complaints mechanism

Any complaint regarding alleged maladministration can be lodged [via the EIB Complaints Mechanism](#). The [European Ombudsman](#) acts as an independent external accountability mechanism of the EIB.

Zero tolerance against fraud and corruption

The EIB has a zero tolerance policy on fraud or corruption. To report allegations of fraud and corruption relating to EIB-financed projects, please contact the [Fraud and Investigation division](#). All complaints will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in line with [the EIB investigation procedures](#) and the [Anti-Fraud Policy](#).

Related publications

- ▶ [EIB Transparency Policy](#)
- ▶ [Guide to procurement](#)

Exhibit 16b - Integrated and Sustainable Community Development Programme



Egypt, Technical Assistance to the Integrated and Sustainable Community Development Programme

Country	Egypt
Other countries	-
Region	Africa
Duration	Start 12 February, 2015 till 15 December, 2020
Field of expertise	Building More Effective Public Administration
Funding	European Investment Bank (EIB)
Project code	11340

The overall objective of the TA operation is to contribute to improvement in the quality of shelter and more general enhancement in living conditions for the urban poor, and the creation of employment opportunities for the latter. Although the focus is primarily urban, other spatially disadvantaged communities are not excluded.

The purpose of the TA operation is to contribute to the timely and efficient implementation of the Integrated and Sustainable Community Development Programme (ISCDP) by supporting the establishment and operations of a Project Preparation and Implementation Unit (PPIU) embedded within the Social Fund for Development (SFD), to oversee the preparation and finalisation of the ISCDP investment Programme.

The Programme Preparation and Implementation Unit (PPIU) will be the implementation body for the ISCDP monies, to be hosted by SFD in Cairo. It will utilise SFD's processes and systems, and comprise a combination of SFD and external resources. Therefore, in addition to project identification and appraisal, a key role for the PPIU will be supporting the development of sub-projects to the point where they represent 'investment-ready' propositions, capable of passing the appraisal process.

In providing TA to the PPIU, the consortium's goal is to make the sub-projects investment-ready and able to pass the appraisal process according to both the SFD's requirements and the EIB's requirements, and assist SFD in meeting the latter effectively and efficiently. The establishment of the PPIU is a condition for the EIB loan.

The expected results of the project are:

- sub-projects/scheme amounting to EUR 90 M are successfully developed, including feasibility studies, preliminary design, investment costs;
- the corresponding EIB loan (up to EUR 45M)and EU grant (up to EUR 15m) are disbursed in a timely manner;
- sub-projects are implemented on time, within budget and according to international standards;
- the capacities of the PPIU staff and sub-project promoters to plan and manage sub-project implementation and the Programme as a whole are enhanced;
- progress reports are sent to the EIB in accordance with the finance contract.

Exhibit 17 – EIB Community Infrastructure Development Programme

(By 2018, SFD had been eliminated and replaced with a new authority for the development of SMEs, MSMEDA – Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority)

MSMEDA obtains €15m grant from EIB to fund infrastructure, community projects in 6 governorates

Projects benefit 2 million Giza, Alexandria, Sharkia, Menoufia, Port Said, Assiut inhabitants, creates 320,000 daily jobs

Hossam Mounir December 10, 2018
Be the first to comment



The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Agency (MSMEDA) and the ministry of investment and international cooperation signed a community infrastructure development programme with the European Investment Bank (EIB) through which the MSMEDA will receive a €15m grant from the EIB to finance infrastructure projects in six governorates.

According to the MSMEDA CEO, Nevine Gamea, the programme aims to implement infrastructure projects in the fields of roads, school renovations, health units, youth centres, market development, open areas, water and sanitation in Giza, Alexandria, Sharkia, Menoufia, Port Said and Assiut governorates.

Gamea stressed that the MSMEDA's interest in implementing the infrastructure and community development projects is a mechanism to meet Egypt's urgent needs to create short-term employment opportunities, as well as the social and economic benefit of these development projects.

She added that these projects benefit 2 million residents of the target areas, and provides about 320,000 daily jobs, noting that these projects will be implemented in cooperation with the directorates of roads, housing, youth, educational buildings, and water and sanitation companies.

The MSMEDA is implementing infrastructure projects to support the environment necessary for the growth and development of small enterprises in communities most in need, in cooperation with the provinces and ministries concerned at the state level, and the benefit from small local contractors and community associations with experience.

Recommended








-  Court sentences ex-Menoufia Governor to 10 years for 'illicit gains'
-  MSMEDA injects EGP 1.9bn loans, grants in Menoufiya, creating 172,000 jobs
-  MSMEDA injects EGP 5.3bn to fund 247,000 projects in 2018
-  MSMEDA signs 2 contracts of EGP 20m to convert 4,000 cars from operating on diesel fuel to CNG
-  Ministry of Health scans 18 million people in "100m Health" initiative
-  MSMEDA injected EGP 9.2bn to finance 441,000 micro, small projects between January 2017 to September 2018: CEO
-  Three projects win MSMEDA's competition for innovators
-  MSMEDA launches electronic platform to micro, small enterprises by 2019: Gamea
-  MSMEDA funded 13,000 micro, small projects in New Valley worth EGP 449m

Exhibit 18 - Joint Programme UNWOMEN and UN-HABITAT "Safe Cities Free of Violence against Women and Girls", Greater Cairo Region, Egypt



Project Document

*Joint Programme UNWOMEN and UN-HABITAT
"Safe Cities Free of Violence against Women and Girls"
Greater Cairo Region, Egypt*

Executive Summary

The Memorandum of Understanding between UN-HABITAT and UNWOMEN outlines the focus area of collaboration in the UNWOMEN led global Programme on *Safe Cities Free of Violence against Women and Girls* which UN-HABITAT joined as a lead global partner. The Programme aims at "increased safety, reduced violence and improved quality of life for women, youth and children in urban settings". Three neighborhoods are piloted in Cairo, Egypt. As part of the joint initiative, UNWOMEN Egypt has made available 90,000 USD to UN-HABITAT Egypt as seed funding for the pilot initiative on community mobilization and urban planning.

The Greater Cairo Region (GCR) is the prime engine for economic growth in Egypt and with over 16 Million inhabitants, close to 20% of the country's population. Due to rapid urban growth, urban planning, infrastructure and service delivery have not been able to keep up. Critical urban issues arise from its population density. Due to inefficient public land management systems and prohibitive housing policies, impoverished individuals have no alternative but to settle in unplanned and sometimes unsafe areas. In addition to the stress on deteriorating infrastructure, public services and transportation systems are stretched to the limit, while severe air and noise pollution levels, chronic traffic congestion, and a complex set of institutional arrangements that fragment responsibilities constrain efficient service delivery.

Even though urban violence affects a majority of women and girls in Egypt's urban centers, the phenomenon has been tolerated as a regular facet of city life and violence against women in public spaces remains a neglected issue. Nevertheless, cities offer women multiple opportunities to break free from rigid gender norms and exercise greater equality in civil society. Because of this, the principles of good governance and equality should underscore urban planning and community initiatives and involve actions that serve to eradicate violence against women and promote their civic empowerment and access to equal rights. The importance of providing women and girls with a sense of security in public areas as well as within their own households cannot be undermined given that it is a basic human need. Women and girls are one of the most vulnerable groups in society and they are at greater risk of being exposed to urban violence. Making cities safe for women and girls fundamentally makes them safer for everyone and enables all residents to the full realization of their fundamental human rights.

UN-HABITAT has gained wide experience of working with local government in Egypt which is the key player in providing services at the local level. The Project will build on this expertise and encourage the creation of strong linkages between local authorities and the targeted communities. UN-HABITAT will associate with the local NGOs working in the respective project locations. Furthermore, UN-HABITAT will closely engage GOPP in the project in order to develop visions and upgrading plans for the pilot neighborhoods, in partnership with the local government of the particular areas.

UN-HABITAT's main goal in the global Programme for the piloted neighborhoods will be (1) Residents, especially women and girls, feel safer in public spaces in the pilot areas; (2) Local authorities better understand the scope of safety for women and girls at neighborhood level and the way to address them; (3) Local communities feel responsible for their immediate environment and respect women's and girls' rights in public spaces; and (4) National legislation adapts urban safety and security guidelines in physical planning and upgrading of public spaces.

Exhibit 19 - List of Acronyms

ACP - Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
AFD - Agence Française de Développement
BMZ - German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CAPMAS - Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics
CDAs - Community Development Association
CDP - Community Development Programme
DG DEVCO - EU Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DG NEAR - Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
EDF - European Development Fund
EIB - European Investment Bank
ENP - European Neighbourhood Policy
EU - European Union
GCR - Greater Cairo Region
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
GIZ - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit or German Development Agency
IMF - International Monetary Fund
ISDF - Informal Settlements Development Facility
KfW - KfW Development Bank
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
NIF - EU Neighbourhood Investment Facility
OCTs - Overseas Countries and Territories
PDP - Participatory Development Program
SFD - Social Fund for Development